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argument is strong enough that on matters of
student concern, the administration must not
fail to consult the students. That is one lesson,
the truth of which clear notions of fair play
would have been enough to drive home, without
the recent sorties against authority which
participants in the recent Rollback Movements
found effective.
But to found it unqualifiedly upon academic
freedom as one other supposed inherent
right of the students, is error that should
not be made, if only to avoid disparaging
attacks from the authorities that the vocal
critics among the students do not know
what they are talking about.
Often used as the concept may have been,
academic freedom is obscured by the failure
of the to distinguish between collective
and individual liberty. To claim that academic
freedom pertains to the students and as
such may be raised against the authorities
is only partly right. To claim exactly
the opposite, that it belongs to the university
and not to the students, shares the same
deficiency.
Academic freedom, the enjoyment of which
by all institutions of higher learning
is guaranteed by the constitution, pertains
to the university as an institution. What
is removed by one hand from state regulation,
and by the other, granted to the university,
that it may transmit by critical teaching
higher education and create an atmosphere
conducive to scholarship, is academic freedom.
It consists in the right of the university
to determine who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.
But academic freedom has also its personal
aspect. Though not guaranteed by special
constitutional provisions, it is, if properly
viewed, a limited field of the more general
freedoms of speech and press. In a questionably
over-narrow treatment, academic freedom
of the scholar as distinguished from academic
freedom of the university, has been limited
to the freedom of the teacher or the student
to inquire into the problems of his science
and to impart his findings either through
publication or instruction without interference
from the authorities, unless the scholars
of his own profession finds his method
professionally unethical or incompetent.
But it has a broader scope than that.
In supplanting outmoded ideas with new
ones, the status of the scholar as an academician
is irresponsible from his status as citizen.
One is at least as important as the other,
and in considering academic freedom, both
are as important as the status of the university.
There is too much truth in society that
will be left unexposed if the academic
freedom to seek and to express the truth
as one personally sees it is unduly limited
to the confines of laboratory walls. And
to so construe the concept as a right pertaining
to the university as an institution and
not to the scholar as well is plain confusion.
Arguments are understood and refutable
least when words are not given their accepted
meaning, and convenient shifts in meaning
made as often as arguments are threatened
with refutation make the resolutions of
conflict unduly postponed.
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